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Abstract
This paper provides a simple general equilibrium model with productive public spending and
distorting taxes. The optimal conditions for the provision of public inputs are obtained under
different tax systems. Also we discuss which factors affect the marginal cost of public funds.
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The optimal provision of public goods calls the existence of distorting taxa-
tion into question. When governments use lump-sum taxes to ﬁnance public
spending, the conventional rule claims that the eﬃcient provision of pub-
l i cg o o d sm u s tb ec a r r i e du pt ot h ep o i n tw h e r et h es u mo ft h em a r g i n a l
rates of substitution equals the marginal cost of providing the public goods
(Samuelson, 1954). However, things are diﬀerent when distorting taxes are
used. Pigou (1947) stressed the deadweight loss caused by non lump-sum
taxes, and argued that the conventional rule may generate an over-supply of
public goods. Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971) and Atkinson and Stern (1974)
enlarge Pigou’s view and ﬁnd another eﬀect: a tax revenue eﬀe c tt h a tp u b l i c
spending may generate when the consumption of taxed goods is encouraged.
Others assumptions and scenarios have been considered. Wildasin (1979,
1984) uses arbitrary distorting taxation to discuss the optimal provision of
public goods. King (1986), Wilson (1991), Konishi (1993), and Gaube (2000)
introduce heterogeneous agents. Aronsson and Sjogren (2001) study the
eﬀect of a non-competitive labour market on the provision of public goods.
Regarding public input provision, the number of contributions is smaller.
Feehan and Matsumoto (2000) study the use of beneﬁtt a x a t i o nt op r o v i d e
public inputs. Also Feehan and Matsumoto (2002) show the diﬀerences be-
tween the ﬁrst best and the second best rules in the provision of public
inputs.
In this paper we are concerned with the optimal provision of a public good
that yields both productive services for ﬁrms and utility gains for consumers.
Many examples of this can be quoted: roads, airports, ports, railways, etc.
Whereas in the case of a consumption public good the reduction in the provi-
sion cost requires fulﬁlling some conditions, our model oﬀers outcomes where
these requirements are relaxed. We present results in which the fall in the
marginal cost of public funds does not exclusively depend on the complemen-
tary relationship between the public input and the taxed goods. Moreover,
we highlight the relevance of deciding which is the untaxed good.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the theoret-
ical framework. In the section 3 the conditions for the optimal provision of
productive public spending with optimal taxes are obtained. Next section
achieves a similar result but when taxes are designed arbitrarily. Section 5
presents some concluding remarks.
12T h e m o d e l
Our model consists of H identical consumers, n+1ﬁrms and a government.
The utility function for the consumer is
U (x,g), (1)
where x is a vector of n +1private goods and g is a pure public good1.
Consumer oﬀers a ﬁxed amount of labour and capital (l and k)a tp r i c e sw
and r. This agent faces consumer prices q, and considers g and his income m
(expressed in terms of good 0 taken as the numeraire) as given. Notice that
m c o m e sf r o mt h es u mo fwl and rk. The next two expressions are obtained
from the consumer’s optimization problem:
xi = xi (q,g , m ) (2)
V (q,g ,m )=Max
{x}
U (x,g),s . t . qx
p = m. (3)
Equation (2) is the demand function for good i, and the equation (3) is the
indirect utility function. The ﬁrms produce exclusively the good i according
to the following production function:
Xi = Fi (Li,K i,g ), (4)
where Li and Ki are the quantities of labour and capital used. Public good g
enters the production function as a public input. The marginal productivity
of each factor is positive and decreasing. Moreover, additional increases in g
r a i s et h ep r o d u c t i v i t yo fp r i v a t ef a c t o r s .I ti sa s s u m e dt h a tt h e r ea r ec o n s t a n t
returns to scale in the private factors. On the other hand, the markets for
goods and services are competitive, with perfect international mobility for
capital and goods, and no obstacles for labour and capital mobility among
sectors. Hence, ﬁrms’ optimization problem allows us to obtain the optimal
factors demands:









where pi is the international price for good Xi. Since labour supply is ﬁxed
in our economy, when the public input g increases, the labour price w rises.
The government is supposed to maximize a Bentham-type social welfare
function subject to a budget constraint that includes two main elements.
The ﬁrst is the production cost of public spending c(g)2. The second are
the resources needed for ﬁnancing productive public spending. We establish
ad valorem taxes so that qi = pi(1 + ti),w h e r eti is the tax rate. Thus, the













ti pi xi (q(t),g ,m(g))




where t is the vector of tax rates. Note that the scheme for government
is considerably diﬀerent in (5) and (6). Whereas the public sector can de-
termine which the optimal taxes are in problem (5), there is a non eﬃcient
requirement in problem (6) for choosing tax rates: each consumption tax
must collect the same resources. This allows us to include government’s
restrictions by deciding the tax policy3.
2C (g) is assumed to be linearly increasing in g.
3Wildasin (1979, 1984) discusses a similar case, where taxes are arbitrarily determined.
33 Optimal provision of public spending with
eﬃcient taxes.
This section deals with the optimal productive public spending and the taxes
that minimize the tax burden. This implies solving the optimization problem







































ti pi − Hx k pk
!
, ∀ k, k =1 ,2,...,n, (8)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. Since indirect utility function can be
expressed in terms of the direct utility function, and the marginal utility of











































The LHS of equation (9) is the sum of marginal beneﬁts of g in terms
of income over all individuals. These beneﬁts consist of the marginal rates
of substitution, the increment in the consumer’s income, and how g aﬀects
the consumption of other goods, and hence the utility level as well. The
R H So fe q u a t i o n( 9 )c o m p r i s e st h es o c i a lc o s ti n v o l v e di np r o v i d i n gg,i .
e. the marginal cost of public funds (MCPF). At this point, the marginal
production cost c
0 (g) must be reduced by the revenue eﬀect that one unit of
public input causes over tax collection. On the other hand, the social cost of
providing g must take into account the deadweight loss by using distorting
taxes (ratio λ/α)4.
4As is well known, the envelope theorem allows us to interpret the Lagrange multiplier
λ as the marginal cost of using taxes diﬀerent to lump-sum.
4Regarding the revenue eﬀect, our model goes beyond the previous litera-
ture. When a consumption public good is considered, the only way to lower
the MCPF is assuming complementarity between the public good and the
taxed good. This paper extends this framework and allows the possibility
t h a tt h eM C P Fd e c r e a s e se v e nw h e nt h et a x e dg o o d sa n dg are substitutes.
Only a non restricted assumption is required: at least a taxed good must be
normal. In that case,
∂x i





is able to overcome the sign of
∂x i
∂g, and a reduction in c
0 (g) takes places.
Another interesting point is the eﬀect of distorting taxes on welfare. The
next proposition sheds light about that.
Proposition 1 If taxed goods are normal, the social marginal cost of raising
tax revenues is bigger than the marginal utility of income, so that α/λ < 1.
Proof. Following Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1971) and Atkinson and Stern











ti pi − Hx k pk
!
, ∀ k. (10)
Using ∂V
∂t k = ∂V
∂q k
∂q k
∂t k, Roy’s identity and rearranging terms, equation (10)





i=1 Ht i pi
∂x i
∂t k + Hx k pk
Hx k pk
, ∀ k. (11)
If we apply the Slutsky’s decomposition in the RHS of (11), the new












ti pi, ∀ k, (12)
where Sik is the Slutsky’s term. Because of the concavity of the expenditure
function, the second term in the RHS of (12) is non positive so that α will be




∂m> 0,i .e .i ft a x e dg o o d sa r en o r m a l .
54 Optimal provision of public spending with
arbitrary taxes.
W ea r en o wc o n c e r n e dw i t ht h ee ﬃciency conditions when taxes are not
chosen optimally, in order to show the implications derived from restrictions
in the design of taxes. As is well-known, the governments have not very scope
to deﬁne tax rates minimizing the tax burden. Although we use a non very
realistic scheme, its simplicity allows us to obtain some interesting results.














































where the second constraint of problem (6) has been used to express t as a
function of g. Using Roy’s identity and dividing both terms by ∂V
∂m= α,t h e















































In essence, the economic interpretation is similar to equation (9). LHS of
equation (14) are the net marginal beneﬁts derived from the provision of g.A
third term arises here: it displays the negative consequences that an increase
of g has on the consumption of taxed goods by means of non-optimal taxes.
RHS of equation (14) is the MCPF of providing g. Also, welfare eﬀects of
distorting taxes and a tax revenue eﬀect have to be considered. An additional
step can be sketched in the proposition 2.
Proposition 2 The more Hicksian complementarity between a numeraire
untaxed good and each taxed good, the smaller MCPF of providing g (Suﬃ-
cient Condition).
6Proof. The MCPF is given by the RHS of equation (14). Among others,
its magnitude depends on the terms situated after c
0 (g). All these terms






dg, which is indeterminate.
In order to know more about its sign, the Slutsky’s decomposition is used
so that we have: H
³Pn







dg. The sign of
Pn
i=j=1 ti pi sij must be studied here. Considering all goods in our economy
(the inclusion of the untaxed good 0 has no consequences), the last term can
be rewritten as follows:
Pn







1+ti qi sij. Since demand functions are homoge-
neous in degree 0,a n dsii < 0, the more Hicksian complementarity between
a numeraire untaxed good and each taxed good, the more intense the sub-
stituibility relationship between taxed goods (bigger sij > 0). Thus, it is
more likely that the sign of
Pn
i=j=1 ti pi sij is closer to become positive, and
a smaller MCPF will be found.
Our model deﬁnes eﬀects on the MCPF which are beyond the immediate
complementarity between g and taxed goods. Unlike Wildasin (1984) or
Chang (2000), we link reductions in the MCPF to the choice of the untaxed
goods.
5C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
The aim of this paper has been the discussion of the optimal provision of
productive public spending when distorting taxation exists. We have built a
general equilibrium model with public expenditure as argument in the utility
and production functions. Two tax schemes have been considered: tax rates
chosen optimally and an arbitrary tax design.
Our results show how the provision of public inputs should take at least
two circumstances into account. Firstly, distorting taxation that causes dead-
weight loss. Secondly, a tax revenue eﬀect that reduces the MCPF. We have
proved that the MCPF may decrease even when the taxed goods and the
public inputs are substitutes. On the other hand, we have also shown that
the choice of the untaxed good is relevant for the magnitude of the MCPF.
This paper has pointed out that the projects of public spending must
consider the costs in terms of social welfare derived from a second best tax-
ation. However, if public goods exert productive services in the economy,
governments should take the tax revenue eﬀe c ti n t oc o n s i d e r a t i o n .S op u b l i c
7investment seems to be a good policy instrument for improving not only the
productivity of the economy but also the social welfare.
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